Syria, the Druze, and Israel

HistoryIsrael
Written By Daniel Stoker

After the collapse of the Assad regime in December, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) entered into Syria while intrenching their positions. Israeli officials have justified their aggressive actions on the grounds that: 1) it is securing its borders against extremists and 2) defending minorities, namely the Druze, in Syria. Today there are nearly 150,000 Druze living under Israeli rule (roughly 120,000 Israeli Druze and another 20-25,000 living in the Golan Heights). Unlike most other Arabs/Palestinians with Israeli citizenship, the Druze serve in the IDF under a system of conscription similar to Jewish Israelis.

The relationship between the Druze and the Zionist movement predates the creation of the state of Israel. In 1930, the Jewish Agency sent Tuvia Ashkenazi to the Jabal al-Druze in present-day Syria to investigate the sympathies of the Druze after their involvement in the Great Syrian Revolt. Simultaneously, Zionist leaders began cultivating relations with the Palestinian-Druze communities in the Galilee. The Zionist administration in Palestine also believed that fostering good relations with the Palestinian Druze could pay dividends with those in Syrian Jabal al-Druze, also known as the Hawran. Itzhak Ben-Zvi, a Zionist official and interlocutor with the Druze, wrote the Jewish Agency’s Political Council saying:

“It is worthwhile to gain their friendship ... our friendly relations with the Palestinian Druze could, in my opinion, have a positive and significant influence on the Druze of the Hauran . . . Both Druze leaders ... emphasized several times that they would never forget this favor and they believe that our fraternity will grow further.”

Throughout the tumultuous politics of Mandate Palestine, the Palestinian Druze leadership staked out a position of neutrality while their co-religionists in Syria were sympathetic to various Arab nationalist movements including the Baath Party. Despite the divergence in their politics, Zionist officials continued to cultivate ties with both Druze communities in the Galilee and those in the Jabal al-Druze in Syria.

Over the years, the Jewish Agency and later the state of Israel in collaboration with some Palestinian Druze crafted and proliferated a narrative of a shared history of sectarian oppression of Druze and Jews under Muslim-rule. While some Palestinian-Druze did participate in the 1948 War against the nascent state of Israel, most remained neutral and some even flirted with forming a pro-Zionist militia. After the war and establishment of Israel, the Palestinian-Druze elite allied itself with the state of Israel and received several benefits not afforded to other Arab citizens in Israel.

In Syria, many Druze entered the military and rose through the ranks to positions of influence. Some Druze officers helped bring the Baath party to power in the 1960s and the Druze were generally over represented in Syria’s military and security services in the early years of the Assad regime. Following the 1967 War, Israel expelled most Syrians from the occupied Golan Heights but allowed the Druze inhabitants to remain confident that they could co-opt them. After the war, Israeli Labor Minister Yigal Allon proposed creating a Druze state in the Golan Heights and Syria’s Quneitra Governorate. Allon’s plan failed. In 1981, Israel announced its intentions to annex the occupied Golan and offered citizenship to the Druze residents which was met with widespread protests and rejection of Israeli IDs. The Assad regime fostered ties with the Druze in the Golan by offering access to college education in the Soviet Union and later in Syria, purchase of Druze produce, and facilitating marriage between the Druze community in Syria and those in the Golan.

After the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War, Druze in the Golan began to accept Israeli citizenship in greater numbers. By 2025, roughly 20 percent of Druze in the Golan held Israeli citizenship. The Druze community in the Golan maintained close ties with their coreligionists in Syria and by extension, Israel has fostered support from some in the Syrian Druze community. After the fall of the Assad regime, some Israeli pundits floated the possibility of the creation of independent Druze state or autonomous enclave in Syria. Many in the Israeli-Druze community (not those in the Golan) held demonstrations urging the IDF to act to defend the Druze in Syria after the most recent spat of sectarian violence outside Damascus.

Israeli overtures toward the Druze in Syria has divided the community. Given the highly fluid nature of the current situation Druze sentiment may change dramatically and suddenly, but according to most analysts the community is divided into several factions with most supporting some degree of alignment with the interim government in Damascus. In recent days Layth al-Balous, affiliated with the Men of Dignity movement that opposed the Assad government, has argued for an agreement with Damascus and condemned an alliance with Israel accusing it of undermining and weakening Syria.

Another Syrian Druze Shaykh, Hikmat al-Hijri, is the most prominent Syria Druze figure opposing an agreement with Damascus. Hijri called the most recent violence a “genocidal campaign” and placed blame on the Syrian government while calling on the international community to intervene to stop the violence. In previous statements he has been critical of President Ahmad al-Sharaa and the interim government. Many analysts have accused al-Hijri of collaborating with Israel. Several prominent figures in Hijri’s faction were closely aligned with the Assad regime, some even serving as officers in the military.

Israel’s critics question its stated motives of protecting minorities including the Druze. During Syria’s decade-long civil war, Israel carried out hundreds of strikes against Iranian positions in the country, but did not intervene to protect ethnic and religious minorities. However, since the collapse of the Assad regime, Israel has carried hundreds of airstrikes targeting the government under questionable circumstances. A plausible explanation for Israel’s Syria policy is that it aims to keep Syria divided and weak in order to maintain its regional supremacy. A second possible motive along similar lines involves Turkey. Basically, Israel is the Druze as a pawn to try and expand its influence to counteract Turkey’s influence within the interim government. This is all very speculative at this moment and should be taken with grain of salt.

Israel’s continued involvement in Syria in my opinion is more likely to bring more danger to the Druze than it is to bring stability to the region. Continued Israeli strikes against the government will harden anti-Druze sentiment in both Syria and the greater region. It also risks further dividing the Syrian community and possibly sparking intra-communal violence. Ultimately, I’m of the opinion that a stable Syria is in Israel’s long-term interests, unfortunately Israel doesn’t see it that way.

Daniel Stoker
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Syria and the Long Shadow of Sectarian Violence