Jubilation, Trepidation, and Syria’s Future
Scenes of celebrations flooded my X (Twitter) feed this past week as Syrians took to the streets commemorating the collapse of the Assad regime’s nearly five and a half decades of oppression. A year ago Syrian revolutionaries or rebels depending on your perspective advanced from Idlib to Aleppo - Homs - to the capital of Damascus as the hollowed out regime forces withered away with little resistance. For many Syrian civilians and activists the events felt like a dream that would never come. A year ago jubilant crowds of Syrians gathered in cities across the country, just as they have been the past couple of days, expressing hope in the future after decades of brutal authoritarian-rule.
#Syria: Ummayad Square in #Damascus probably like never before, after a sea of people gathered today for the festivities of the Liberation Day. https://t.co/dGhQ0poR6J pic.twitter.com/KN3FosBX2t
— Qalaat Al Mudiq (@QalaatAlMudiq) December 8, 2025
As Syrians gathered, stunned analysts and pundits tried to explain what had just happened and the hard work that lay ahead of Ahmad al-Sharaa and his victorious group of rebels if Syria was going to recover from twelve-long years of civil war. Assad apologists emphasized al-Sharaa’s past ties to Al-Qaeda and warned of the looming Islamization of the remnants of the Syrian state. Assad’s critics noted the end of the Assad regime presented an opportunity to building a new Syria more representative of its population. As with any revolution, the fall of Assad created a mixed atmosphere of hope and fear of the unknown. New winners and new losers will surely rise and fall in the coming years, but to what degree the future leaders will meet the aspirations of Syria’s revolutionaries remains unknown.
Since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the creation of Syria, its people have known mostly uncertainty. For twenty-six years the French occupied the newly created territory attempting to control its people by pitting its people against each other. Less than four years after its independence, Syria became the scene of what most historians believe to be the first US-backed coup in the Middle East. Between 1949-1970, Syria witnessed at least eight coups and coup attempts. Its brief political union with Egypt was plagued by infighting. Its two wars with Israel ended in calamity. Eventually, Hafez al-Assad seized power and ruled with iron-fist building an Orwellian security-state that brutally punished even its most benign critics. Given Syria’s history of instability before the brutality of the Assad regime, skeptics had very good reason to assume the worst. Assad’s collapse created a power vacuum that opened the door of the civil war simply moving from one phase (fighting Assad) to another (fighting each other). Given the obstacles that stood in front of Syria’s new leaders a year ago, it is fair to say that they have outperformed expectations (although the bar was pretty low to begin with).
Perhaps the most stunning achievement of the past year has been interim Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa’s transformation from Jihadi militant into a pragmatic diplomat. President al-Sharaa, who fought with al-Qaeda in Iraq and lead an Islamist militia during the civil war, won over the backing of the region’s Sunni powers including Saudi Arabia and Turkey and was able to parlay that success into support in Western capitals. With support from Saudi Crown Prince Muhammad Bin Salman, al-Sharaa was able to obtain temporary sanctions relief from the US and has put Syria on a path toward greater global integration. In spite of Israel’s hawkish response to the Assad’s collapse, al-Sharaaa has expressed openness to security cooperation with Jerusalem and a diplomatic security settlement along the border. While al-Sharaa has expressed a willingness to join the Abraham Accords, this remains unlikely as long as the current Israeli government pursues its territorially maximalist aims.
President’s al-Sharaa and his interim government’s handling of domestic affairs has yielded much more mixed results than in foreign policy. The government has generally avoided a return to war in spite of regional, ethnic, and sectarian tensions that persist within Syria. During the civil war, the Syrian opposition was plagued by infighting. In general, the government has managed to keep its coalition together over the past year. However, tensions with Syrian Democratic Forces in the northeast, the Druze community in Suwayda, and the coastal regions dominated by Alawites have erupted into bouts of sectarian bloodletting that have threatened to further destabilize the country. If Syria is going to avoid fracturing altogether, al-Sharaa and his government are going to have build inclusive institutions that inspire trust across Syria’s diverse populace. This must include holding to account bad actors from al-Sharaa’s militias and military.
So far, the Sharaa government has refrained from enacting an explicitly Islamist agenda. In Damascus, bar remain open and alcohol is available. Women are free to dress as they please and the government is even recruiting them into the police. Given the overrepresentation of former Sunni jihadists in Syria’s security forces and the sectarian violence on the coast in March and in Suwayda in July, fears of the emergence of sectarian Sunni state persist. More concerning for the government is the economy. While diplomacy has yielded sanctions relief, that has yet to translate into economic results. The economy continues to lag and reconstruction of the country’s decimated infrastructure has yet to begin. Sharaa’s placement of his brother Hazem and other members of his inner circle in charge of fledgeling economic institutions with little public oversight has sparked concerns of cronyism. Some Assad-connected businessmen have reached opaque deals with the state to avoid prison likely in an effort to protect the war-weakened economy.
Politically there are no real checks on al-Sharaa’s power and no firm timeline for the transition. This is not terribly surprising as al-Sharaa’s rule in Idlib skewed authoritarian. A Constitutional declaration in March and a half-hearted attempt at elections in October leave much to be desired. Sharaa’s authoritarian impulses aside, he does seem to genuine respond to internal pressures and the new Syrian government has refrained from crackdowns on freedom of expression and permitted criticism from his opponents. As previously mentioned the governments needs to expand its constituency beyond conservative Sunni Muslims and better reflect Syrian society.
There remains much work to do in Syria, but one year one Syrians have cause to celebrate even if there are doubts and questions lurking in the near future. As Syrians and their new government move forward it will likely be mixed with both faith and trepidation. Over the past week dozens of think pieces, editorials, and personal accounts have been printed below are just a few of my suggested reading:
“The Unruly History that Weighs on the New Syria” New Lines Magazine
“A Year Later, What is your Assessment of the Assad Downfall?” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
“Syria’s transition has gone better than expected” The Economist
“Syria uneasily celebrates a year of liberation” The Economist
“A Year After Assad’s Fall, I Still Remember That Glorious Morning” Time
“Celebrating Syria’s Liberation from a Prison Cell in Iraq” New Lines Magazine